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Studies of high-level models of visual object categorization have left unresolved issues of neurobiological relevance, including how
features are extracted from the image and the role played by memory capacity in categorization performance. We compared the
ability of a comprehensive set of models to match the categorization performance of human observers while explicitly accounting for
the models numbers of free parameters. The most successful models did not require a large memory capacity, suggesting that a
sparse, abstracted representation of category properties may underlie categorization performance. This type of representation––
diﬀerent from classical prototype abstraction––could also be extracted directly from two-dimensional images via a biologically
plausible early-vision model, rather than relying on experimenter-imposed features.
 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In humans, object categorization is one of the primary
tasks of the visual system. Sensory processing of visual
stimuli, along with prior visual experience, leads to
categorization judgments that can ultimately be used for
cognition. In the last 30 years, research in mathematical
psychology has discovered much about the processes of
visual categorization (e.g., Ashby, 1992a; Ashby &
Maddox, 1993; Ashby & Waldron, 1999; Nosofsky,
1984, 1991; Reed, 1972; Smith & Minda, 1998) by
combining the techniques of visual psychophysics and
computational modeling to develop high-level theories
of categorization. Despite the predictive success of these
theories, there exists a gap between the descriptive
framework of the models, and our current knowledge
of the neuronal mechanisms involved in categorization.
An important aim therefore is to shorten this gap by
extending models so that their implementations are
reasonable in light of recent developments in the
neurophysiology of object recognition and categoriza-* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: rjpeters@klab.caltech.edu (R.J. Peters).
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doi:10.1016/S0042-6989(03)00279-7tion (Ashby & Ell, 2001; Freedman, Riesenhuber, Pog-
gio, & Miller, 2001; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin,
Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott, &
Chun, 1997; Op de Beeck, Wagemans, & Vogels, 2001;
Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). In this study, we address
three key aspects of categorization models, each of
which can be studied with psychophysical experiments
and be informed by neurobiology.
First, current categorization models typically depend
on high-level multidimensional representations of in-
coming stimuli (Ashby, 1992b, Chap. 16; Ashby &
Maddox, 1993). Edelman (1999) reviewed evidence
suggesting that such representations are intimately
linked with the perceptual similarity of stimuli. A com-
mon technique used to infer implicit psychological rep-
resentations is to apply multidimensional scaling (MDS)
to observers similarity judgments about a set of stimuli.
Presently, the link between these psychophysical mea-
sures of similarity and the neuronal mechanisms un-
derlying stimulus representation in the primate visual
system remains poorly understood. New approaches
using functional brain imaging in humans (Edelman,
Grill-Spector, Kushnir, & Malach, 1998) and electro-
physiological recordings in trained macaque monkeys
(Op de Beeck et al., 2001; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002) are
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mately have to rely on comparisons between inferred
psychological representations in monkey and human
observers. Since it is nearly impossible to train animals
to give graded similarity ratings between pairs of objects
(the common method in human studies), animal studies
must rely on two-alternative forced-choice methods in-
stead. It is therefore important to directly compare these
two ways of rating object similarity directly in human
subjects.
Second, in a biological system, any high-level repre-
sentation must be built from lower-level representations,
and in vision this means that all representations must
ultimately trace back to the retinal input. Many cate-
gorization models presuppose that the high-level (ex-
ternal) features used by the experimenter to deﬁne the
objects are the same as those used internally by the
observer when making a categorization decision. For
example, many categorization studies have used a set of
circles with bisecting lines, deﬁned by two features: the
diameter of the circle, and the angle of the bisecting line
(e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 1993). This approach has cer-
tainly been fruitful, and MDS studies have demon-
strated strong similarities between the external and
internal feature representations. Nevertheless, apparent
irregularities in the categorization process that might be
inexplicable in terms of high-level representations, could
appear entirely natural in the light of biological early
vision. At the least, features such as angle of the bisecting
line are not likely to be represented explicitly by neurons
involved in visual perception; rather, a population of
neurons might form a distributed representation, in
which each neuron responds preferentially to a single
range of orientations. Whether such diﬀerences have an
eﬀect on the output of categorization models is an em-
pirical question. We have tested a set of hybrid models,
in which an early-vision model based on Riesenhuber
and Poggio (1999) is used to process the input in image
space, yielding a set of coarse spatial maps, one for each
of a small number of local image features. These maps
are then used as input to the high-level categorization
models after a dimensionality reduction step.
Third and last, the models approximate categoriza-
tion decisions using a mechansim based on the multi-
dimensional representation of incoming stimuli, plus
possible auxiliary representations, such as memory tra-
ces. This process is typically controlled by a number of
free parameters, which are ﬁtted with the goal of
matching human categorization behavior. However, a
simple statistical comparison between models––even
after accounting for the number of free parameters––
may ignore important diﬀerences in the neurobiological
implications of the models. For example, one successful
model, the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky,
1984), assumes that all training images are stored in
memory; a literal interpretation of the GCM mightconclude that the neuronal substrate of categorization
also scales linearly with the number of exemplars in a
category, or that categorization in biological systems
involves only simple memorization, without any cate-
gory-level abstraction (Knowlton, 1999). To provide a
more detailed look at such issues, we introduce a
roaming-exemplar model (RXM) that draws from neural
networks (Poggio & Girosi, 1990; Rosseel, 1996) and
exemplar-based models of categorization (Kruschke,
1992; Nosofsky, 1991; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKin-
ley, 1992). The RXM also has much in common with the
striatal pattern classiﬁer (SPC) of Ashby and Waldron
(1999), including the fact that its memory traces are free
parameters. This stands in contrast to previous exem-
plar-based models, and hence neurobiological plausi-
bility can be assessed directly by accounting for numbers
of free parameters when comparing ﬁtted models.2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Eighteen psychophysics subjects (ages 18–25) from
the Caltech community participated as paid volunteers
in the experiments described below. Informed consent
was obtained from all subjects, and experimental pro-
cedures were approved by the California Institute of
Technologys Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects.
2.2. Stimuli
We used three types of schematic, line-drawn visual
stimuli (Fig. 1): Brunswik faces and tropical ﬁsh out-
lines, which have been used previously (see below), plus
a new set of ‘‘cartoon face’’ images. Each type of visual
object was parameterized along four dimensions com-
prising the stimulus parameter space. Diﬀerent sets of
objects were assigned to conﬁgurations, which contained
equal numbers of training exemplars assigned to each of
two categories, as well as an additional number of test
exemplars. The training exemplars from the two cate-
gories were always chosen so as to be linearly separable
in the objects parameter space; that is, the members
of the two categories could be separated by some 3-D
hyperplane in the 4-D parameter space.
2.2.1. Brunswik faces
These line-drawn face stimuli (Fig. 1a; Brunswik &
Reiter, 1937) have been used frequently in categoriza-
tion experiments both with human (Nosofsky, 1991;
Reed, 1972) and non-human observers (pigeons, Huber
& Lenz, 1996; monkeys, Sigala, Gabbiani, & Logothetis,
2002). Each face consists of a simple ovaloid outline
with internal features deﬁned by (compressed) circles
(EH) Eye height
(ES) Eye separation
(NL) Nose length
(MH) Mouth height
(EH) Eye height
(ES) Eye separation
(NL) Nose length
(MH) Mouth height
(DF) Dorsal fin
(TF) Tail fin
(VF) Ventral fin
(MA) Mouth area
Fig. 1. Three object classes, each with four stimulus parameters con-
trolling that object type, were used in similarity and categorization
psychophysics tasks. Three sample objects of each type demonstrate
the typical ranges of the parameters. (a) Brunswik faces. (b) Cartoon
faces. Although these faces are described by 28 parameters, the present
study used only the 4 parameters corresponding to those in (a). (c) Fish
outlines.
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height (EH; the vertical distance from the centers of the
eyes to the center of the face), eye separation (ES; the
horizontal distance separating the centers of the eyes),
nose length (NL; the vertical length of the nose line), and
mouth height (MH; the vertical distance from the center
of the face to the mouth line).Fig. 2. Experiment 1 used ﬁve 20-object sets, each deﬁned in a 4-D
parameter space. (a) The abstract conﬁguration is shown in projections
onto the six possible pairs of dimensions. All-exemplars fall on a
3 · 3· 3· 3 grid, except for the two category prototypes, which were
among the test exemplars. Dashed lines indicate where the two cate-
gories training exemplars are linearly separable. (b–f) For illustration,2.2.2. Cartoon faces
These stimuli (Fig. 1b) were introduced in an fMRI
study (Jovicich, Peters, Koch, Chang, & Ernst, 2000) as
a parameterized object type that produced stronger ac-
tivation in the human fusiform face area (Kanwisher
et al., 1997) than did Brunswik faces. The cartoon faces
extend the Brunswik faces in several ways to make the
faces appear more human: a simple band of hair is ad-
ded around the top of the head, the size and dilation of
the pupils may be varied, eyebrows are added above the
eyes, the nose outline is deﬁned by an extended open
contour, and the mouth is deﬁned as a Bezier curve
rather than a straight line. To control these additional
features, the cartoon faces have a total of 28 stimulus
parameters; however, in the present study only the four
parameters corresponding to the Brunswik face dimen-
sions were varied, while the other 24 parameters were
held constant.the training exemplars of category one (thin black lines) are superim-
posed upon those of category two (thick gray lines), for (b) cartoon
faces with dimensions {1¼EH, 2¼ES, 3¼NL, 4¼ML}, (c) ﬁsh
outlines {TF, VF, DF, MA}, (d) Brunswik faces {EH, ES, NL, MH},
(e) Brunswik faces {NL, MH, EH, ES}, and (f) Brunswik faces {MH,
EH, NL, ES}. See Fig. 1 for abbreviations.2.2.3. Tropical ﬁsh outlines
These line-drawn images (Fig. 1c) were ﬁrst used to
oﬀer a completely novel stimulus set to monkey ob-
servers in a categorization task (Sigala et al., 2002).Other ﬁsh images have been used previously in studies of
categorization in people and pigeons (Hernstein & de
Villiers, 1980) and in monkeys (Vogels, 1999). Each ﬁsh
image is composed of four cubic spline curves that were
ﬁtted to scanned outlines of tropical ﬁsh. By adjusting
one control point of each of the curves, four features
of the outlines could be smoothly deformed: the dorsal
ﬁn (DF), tail ﬁn (TF), ventral ﬁn (VF), and mouth area
(MA).
2.3. Similarity tasks
Two diﬀerent similarity tasks (pairs and triads tasks)
were performed with the 20-object conﬁgurations used
in Experiment 1 (see Section 2.5; Fig. 2). For each
conﬁguration, subjects psychophysical responses were
used to form a 20 · 20 experimental dissimilarity matrix
with entries dij, using a procedure speciﬁc to the task (see
descriptions below). This matrix was then used to esti-
mate subjects psychological representations of the
stimuli (see Section 2.4).
In the pairwise comparison task (Borg & Groenen,
1997, Chap. 6.2) or pairs task, subjects viewed sequences
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was presented for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank screen.
Subjects could respond at any time during that 4 s in-
terval with a button press between 1 and 9, indicating
how similar the objects appeared. Subjects were in-
structed to choose ‘‘9’’ if and only if the two objects were
identical. Each of the 400 possible pairings of the 20
objects was presented three times throughout the ex-
periment, giving 1200 total trials. For each pair of ob-
jects xi and xj, the dissimilarity matrix entry dij was
taken to be 9 sij, where sij is the average similarity
rating over the n trials containing objects i and j (n ¼ 3
for i ¼ j, n ¼ 6 for i 6¼ j).
The triads task, a variant of the anchor stimulus
method (Borg & Groenen, 1997, Chap. 6.2), is a two-
alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) task, and as such it
has been particularly useful for studies involving non-
verbal observers (e.g., human infants, Arabie, Kosslyn,
& Nelson, 1975; monkeys, Sigala et al., 2002). Subjects
viewed sequences of simultaneously presented triads of
objects, arrayed horizontally. Each triad ðx1; x2; x3Þ was
presented for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank screen.
Subjects could respond at any time during that 4 s trial
with a button press indicating whether the left pair
ðx1; x2Þ or the right pair ðx2; x3Þ appeared more similar.
Time constraints prohibited using all possible triad
combinations. Instead, the 6840 possible triads
ðxi; xj; xkÞ of the 20 objects were sorted by the Euclidean
distance in stimulus parameter space between the left-
most and rightmost stimuli (dðxi; xkÞ), and the 1710
triads with the largest such distances were used for
psychophysics. Finally, subjects binary responses in the
triads task were transformed into analog dissimilarities
dij using a procedure described in Sigala et al. (2002).2.4. MDS analysis
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to ﬁnd a
set bX ¼ fx^1; . . . ; x^Ng of N 4-D vectors x^i, that best re-
ﬂected the internal psychological representation used by
a subject when performing a similarity task. The best
such representation is found by minimizing the stress
r ¼ 1
2
X
i;j
ðdðx^i; x^jÞ  dijÞ2;
where d is the Euclidian distance and dij are the dis-
similarities computed from subjects responses in one of
the similarity tasks. 1 These representations allow for a1 Note that this procedure deviates from a strict deﬁnition of MDS
because the dimensionality of the representation space was ﬁxed to 4,
rather than being a free parameter. However, previous studies using
Brunswik faces and ﬁsh stimuli have obtained satisfactory MDS
solutions with 4-D representations (Nosofsky, 1991; Sigala et al.,
2002).clear correspondence between the scaled dimensions and
the physical stimulus parameters, as explained next.
To align the MDS conﬁguration bX with the original
conﬁguration X , we used an isometric Procrustes
transformation P , consisting of a rigid rotation, trans-
lation, and uniform scaling (Borg & Groenen, 1997,
Chap. 19). The optimal Procrustes transformation Pmin
minimizes the loss function LðPÞ ¼Pi d2ðxi; P ðx^iÞÞ. This
minimum value LðPminÞ––the residual squared distance
(RSD)––quantiﬁes the dissimilarity between subjects
psychological representation bX and the original stimu-
lus conﬁguration X .
To determine whether the observed RSDs were
smaller than would be expected by chance, a Monte
Carlo technique was used. RSDs were computed be-
tween the original conﬁguration and 105 random con-
ﬁgurations whose parameters were drawn from a
uniform distribution over ½0; 1	. The resulting distribu-
tion was used to estimate the signiﬁcance levels of the
RSDs of the pairs and triads MDS conﬁgurations.
2.5. Categorization tasks
The categorization experiments consisted of a training
phase and a testing phase. In both phases, subjects
viewed a series of objects presented one at a time. Each
object was presented for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank
screen. During each 4 s trial, subjects pressed one of two
buttons indicating to which category the object be-
longed. In the training phase, subjects were shown only
the two categories training exemplars, and were given
feedback in the form of a high- or low-pitch tone indi-
cating whether their response was correct or incorrect,
respectively. Subjects performed training blocks of 100
trials until they scored P85% correct on a single block.
Next, they moved into the testing phase, in which they
were shown the previously unseen test exemplars in
addition to the training exemplars that they had viewed
during the training phase. Subjects received no feedback
on their responses during the testing phase.
In Experiment 1, the values for each stimulus di-
mension were quantized to three possible values for each
dimension, so that the set of possible objects lay on a
3 · 3 · 3 · 3 grid in stimulus parameter space. The con-
ﬁguration of 20 objects on this grid (Fig. 2a) followed
that used in Nosofsky (1991) and Sigala et al. (2002),
with 5 training exemplars for each category, plus 10 test
exemplars that included the two category prototypes.
For each set of objects, each of the four stimulus pa-
rameters for that object type was assigned to one of the
four generic dimensions in the stimulus conﬁguration
shown in Fig. 2a. It is signiﬁcant how the parameters are
assigned, since each generic dimension carries diﬀerent
information about category membership. For example,
the categories were linearly separable in projections onto
2-D planes for pairs of stimulus dimensions ð1; 2Þ, ð1; 3Þ,
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an objects category than were the other dimensions. In
all, ﬁve sets of stimuli were used in Experiment 1. These
included three sets of Brunswik faces in which the
stimulus parameters were assigned to the generic di-
mensions in diﬀerent orderings ({EH, ES, NL, MH},
{NL, MH, EH, ES}, and {MH, EH, NL, ES}), a set of
cartoon faces ({EH, ES, NL, ML}), and a set of ﬁsh
outlines ({TF, VF, DF, MA}).
In Experiment 2, a larger conﬁguration of 80 objects
was used (Fig. 3), with 10 training exemplars for each of
the two categories, plus 60 test exemplars. The exemp-
lars were arranged on a 7 · 7 · 7 · 7 grid in the stimulus
parameter space. There were 12 such sets, identical ex-
cept that the discretization grid of each set was rotated
through diﬀerent angles (h ¼ n 
 15, n 2 ½0; . . . ; 11	) in
the eye-height/eye-separation plane of parameter space.2.6. Categorization models
We tested several categorization models by ﬁtting
them to match the human observers response proﬁles
from the testing phase of the categorization tasks. Each
model receives input in a 4-D feature space (i.e., not
image space), and produces an output that represents
a categorization probability for the input object. TheFig. 3. Experiment 2 used these 12 sets of Brunswik faces. Each image
shows the 10 training exemplars of category one (thin black lines)
superimposed upon the 10 training exemplars of category two (thick
gray lines). The sets diﬀer only in the angle by which the objects are
rotated in eye-height/eye-separation plane of feature space.models we tested fall into several categories, each of
which proposes a unique architecture for the categori-
zation process (see Fig. 4), with diﬀerent free parame-
ters, and diﬀerent assumptions about the memory usage
of the system being modeled. These factors must be
weighed along with the raw goodness-of-ﬁt when as-
sessing the neurobiological plausibility of the diﬀerent
models.
In general, we assume (1) that each exemplar is de-
scribed by a point in an R-dimensional space (Ashby,
1992b, Chap. 16), x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xRÞ, whose components
may be drawn either from the original stimulus con-
ﬁguration, from an MDS conﬁguration, or from a
conﬁguration based on features extracted from an early-
vision model (see Section 2.6.5), and (2) that each cat-
egory is deﬁned by N training exemplars fx1; . . . ; xNg.
2.6.1. Exemplar models
Exemplar models associate memory traces of M
(16M 6N ) stored exemplars 2 fy1; . . . ; yMg with each
category. Several model subtypes diﬀer in the way that
these stored exemplars are selected:
• All-exemplar models (Fig. 4a) assume M ¼ N , and
yi ¼ xi. All of the training exemplars are explicitly
stored in memory, so these models have a high mem-
ory demand that is linear in the number of training
exemplars. All-exemplar models include the average-
distance model (ADM, Reed, 1972) and generalized
context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1991).
• Prototype (one-exemplar) models (Fig. 4b) assume
M ¼ 1; each category stores only the arithmetic mean
of the categorys training exemplars, y1 ¼ 1=N
P
i xi.
These models have low and constant memory de-
mand, independent of the number of training exemp-
lars; however, the models imply a more complex
computational mechanism to estimate the prototype
during trial-by-trial exposure to the training exemp-
lars. Prototype models include the weighted prototype
model (WPM; Reed, 1972) and the weighted prototype
similarity model (WPSM; Nosofsky, 1991).
• In the proposed roaming-exemplar modelhMi
(RXMhMi, Fig. 4c), each category stores M exemp-
lars, each of which is a linear combination of the
training exemplars for that category, yj ¼
P
i wijxi.
Under the neurobiological consideration that neu-
rons do not represent objects far diﬀerent from those2 Our usage of the term ‘‘exemplar’’ to denote stored memory traces
reﬂects a meaning of ideal meaning or pattern or prototype, rather than
a strict meaning of previously seen stimulus. For example, in the RXM,
the stored exemplars are generalizations of the memory traces used in
all-exemplar or prototype models, and are most likely not previously
seen stimuli.
Fig. 4. Schematic depictions of several kinds of categorization models. Each diagram shows a hypothetical set of training exemplars from two
categories (d and ) in a 2-D feature space, plus a test exemplar (·) which is to be classiﬁed. (a–c) Three types of models which rely on distances
(indicated by dashed lines) between a test exemplar and each stored exemplar from both categories: (a) all-exemplar model, in which the set of stored
exemplars is just the set of training exemplars; (b) one-exemplar, or prototype model, in which the single stored exemplar per category is the arithmetic
mean of that categorys training exemplars; (c) roaming-exemplar modelhMi (RXMhMi) and striatal pattern classiﬁerhMi (SPChMi), in which each
category hasM (in this case,M ¼ 2) stored exemplars, which must lie within the polygon that circumscribes the training exemplars (dotted lines). The
RXMhMi uses a summed-similarity decision rule, while the SPChMi uses a uses a nearest-neighbor decision rule. (d) Linear boundary model, in which
the model uses a linear boundary that separates the categories to classify test exemplars according to the side of this boundary on which they fall. (e)
Cue-validity model, which classiﬁes a test exemplar according to the total cue-validity across all features; the cue-validity cvi for category i of a given
feature is the posterior probability of an exemplar with that feature belonging to category i (values of cv1 and cv2 are shown).
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emplars are restricted to a region circumscribed by
the training exemplars, so the weights are constrained
by wij P 0 and
P
i wij ¼ 1 for all j. The number of
stored exemplars M is not a free parameter of a given
RXMhMi, but the stimulus parameters of those
stored exemplars are free parameters of the model.
Thus, when the RXM is ﬁtted to a dataset, the num-
ber of stored exemplars is chosen and ﬁxed at the
start, although RXMhMis with diﬀerent (ﬁxed) val-
ues of M may be ﬁtted to the same dataset. The mem-
ory demand of the RXMhMi varies between that of
the prototype models (for M ¼ 1) and that of the
all-exemplar models (for M ¼ N ); the computational
complexity is similar to that of the prototype models,
since some mechanism must adjust the stored exemp-
lars during training.
Next, the exemplar model computes a similarity
measure between the test exemplar x and each of the
stored exemplars y, based on a weighted Euclidean
distance: daðx; yÞ ¼ ð
P
j ajðxj  yjÞ2Þ1=2, with aj P 0 andP
aj ¼ 1 (other metrics are possible; see e.g., Ashby &
Maddox, 1993). The coeﬃcients aj, called attentional
weights, are intended to model the ability of human
observers to attend preferentially to the most task-rele-
vant stimulus features. The similarity s decays with the
distance d, either linearly (s ¼ d, as in the RXM,ADM, and WPM), or exponentially (s ¼ ecd , as in the
GCM and WPSM; see Shepard, 1987).
Then, for each test exemplar x, the evidence Ei for
category Ci is given as the sum of similarities between
x and the M stored exemplars yij of that category:
EiðxÞ ¼
PM
j¼1 sðx; yijÞ. Finally, the models categorization
of x is based on the expression E1ðxÞ  E2ðxÞ þ n > t,
where n represents zero-mean Gaussian noise with
variance r2, and t is a threshold parameter; x is assigned
to category 1 if this expression is true, otherwise to
category 2.
The free parameters of the exemplar models are thus
ða; c; t; rÞ, plus 2M stored exemplars for the RXMhMi.
2.6.2. Striatal pattern classiﬁer
The RXM shares a very similar mathematical for-
mulation with the striatal pattern classiﬁer (SPC) pro-
posed by Ashby and Waldron (1999), although the
mathematical elements have been treated with diﬀerent
neurobiological interpretations (Ashby & Ell, 2001).
Both kinds of model rely on a set of units that represent
diﬀerent locations in feature space, but the models diﬀer
in how each categorys evidence is computed for a given
test exemplar. The exemplar models compute the sum of
similarities between the test exemplar and each stored
exemplar, whereas the SPC associates a test exemplar
with the category of the nearest striatal pattern (in this
respect the SPC resembles a k-nearest neighbor model
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measure that decays linearly with distance. In order to
maintain a formal similarity with the other models, we
used the following decision rule for the SPC: for each
test exemplar, the evidence for each category is given by
the maximum of the similarities between the test exem-
plar and that categorys stored exemplars. Thus, in the
case of one stored exemplar per category, the SPCh1i
and the RXMh1i form identical decision surfaces.
However, with M > 1, the SPChMi has a piecewise-lin-
ear boundary, while the RXMhMi has a curved decision
boundary.
2.6.3. Boundary models
Decision bound theory (Ashby & Maddox, 1993)
proposes that human perceptions of category exemplars
are instances of random variables with multivariate
normal distributions. Given a particular perception, the
optimal decision strategy is to choose the category of
which that perception was more likely an instance. Thus
the decision boundary (the locus where both categories
have equal probability densities) falls along the inter-
section of the graphs of the two probability density
surfaces. If the covariance matrices of the exemplar
distributions are identical for the two categories, then
the decision boundary is a linear surface (i.e., a hyper-
plane); otherwise, it is a quadratic surface.
We tested the probit linear model (PBI; Fig. 4d;
Ashby & Gott, 1988), which is trained to separate the
categories training exemplars with a boundary de-
scribed by a normal vector b and a threshold t. Fol-
lowing training, a test exemplar x is classiﬁed according
to the side of the boundary on which it falls:
x 
 bþ n > t ) x 2 C1:
The PBI model parameters are ðb; t; rÞ; however the
variance of the noise is assumed to be r2 ¼ 1, since
identical models are obtained for ðb; t; rÞ as for
ðkb; kt; krÞ with k 6¼ 0.
2.6.4. Cue-validity models
Cue-validity models (Fig. 4e) treat each stimulus pa-
rameter as an independent indicator of category mem-
bership, based on the relative numbers of exemplars
from the two opposing categories that exhibit the cue (a
particular value of a stimulus parameter). Thus, for
example, a beard is a somewhat uncommon feature of
male faces, yet it is an even less common feature of fe-
male faces, and so provides a highly valid cue to the
gender category of a face.
In the weighted cue-validity model (WCVM; Reed,
1972), the validity for category Ci of the jth parameter xj
of a test exemplar x is deﬁned as vijðxÞ ¼ pðCijxjÞ. The
overall cue-validity Vi is a weighted sum of these valid-
ities, ViðxÞ ¼
P
j ajvijðxÞ, where the aj are attentional
weights as in the exemplar models, with aj P 0 andP
j ai ¼ 1. Also as in the exemplar models, the decision
rule incorporates Gaussian noise n and a threshold t; if
the expression V1ðxÞ  V2ðxÞ þ n > t is true, x is assigned
to category 1, otherwise to category 2.
A modiﬁed version of this model, called the weighted
frequency cue-validity model (WFCVM; Reed, 1972),
uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition for the validity. A weight
factor, q ¼ ð1þ F ðxmÞÞ1, is computed from the overall
number of times F ðxmÞ that the parameter value xm oc-
curs in exemplars from both categories. Then the
WCVMs original validity vij is used to deﬁne the new
validity ~vijðxÞ ¼ 12 
 qþ vijðxÞ 
 ð1 qÞ, so that the valid-
ities of rare parameter values carry little information
about category membership. This reﬂects the idea that
subjects will pay more attention to common features.
The free parameters for both the WCVM and the
WFCVM are ða; t; rÞ.
2.6.5. HMAX
In order to assess the biological plausibility of the
categorization models from a computational perspec-
tive, we adapted a hierarchical model of early vision
(‘‘HMAX’’) presented by Riesenhuber and Poggio
(1999). HMAX operates directly in image space, in
contrast to the categorization models described above,
which operate in feature space. Our approach was to
extract a new feature space representation from the
output of HMAX, which could then be used as an al-
ternate input for ﬁtting the categorization models, to be
compared with model ﬁts obtained using the original
physical feature space.
In brief, HMAX operates through two stages of
‘‘simple’’ and ‘‘complex’’ units (S1, C1, S2, and C2). The
S1 representation is obtained by ﬁltering the image with
a bank of Gabor-like ﬁlters tuned for multiple orienta-
tions and spatial scales. The C1 representation is pro-
duced by pooling the activations of S1 units at
neighboring spatial locations and across similar spatial
scales. At the S2 level, more complex features are
formed by pooling the activations of a 2 · 2 spatial array
of neighboring C1 units tuned to speciﬁc orientations; in
this way, diﬀerent S2 units begin to represent features
such as ‘‘elongated contour’’ or ‘‘corner’’ or ‘‘disk’’.
Finally, each C2 unit pools across S2 units tuned to the
same feature type, but at diﬀerent spatial scales and/or
spatial locations.
We made several modiﬁcations relative to the original
model of Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999); these modiﬁ-
cations were guided by the goal of increasing the vari-
ance of the HMAX outputs across the set of input
images, so as to provide a rich but compact foundation
for a subsequent categorization stage. First, instead of
each C2 unit pooling across the entire image space, we
subdivided the image into a 6 · 6 grid, with each C2 unit
responding only to one of the 36 subregions. This in-
creased granularity allowed the model to extract features
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models. In addition, we restricted the number of orien-
tation ﬁlters among the S1 units from four to two (i.e.,
just horizontal and vertical). This retained the models
ability to represent the variability among the simple
schematic input images, but at the same time signiﬁ-
cantly reduced the dimensionality of the output space:
since each S2/C2 feature type represented a four-part
conﬁguration of two possible S1/C1 orientations, there
were 24 ¼ 16 S2/C2 feature types (rather than 44 ¼ 256
as in the original model). With 36 spatial locations, this
gave a total of 36 · 16 ¼ 576 C2 units. To reduce this
representation to a manageable size for input to the
categorization models, we applied principal component
analysis to the C2 activation vectors obtained across all
of the input images in a set. In general, we found that
>95% of the variance could be recovered with the ﬁrst 50
of the 576 principal components, and 80% of the
variance was recovered with only the ﬁrst 4 components.
Therefore, for comparison with the four-dimensional
physical parameter conﬁgurations, we used the ﬁrst 4
principal components from the modiﬁed-HMAX C2
activations to test how well the categorization models
would fare with a biologically plausible input derived
from the image space representation of the stimuli.2.7. Model-ﬁtting
We ﬁtted models based on (1) the objects physical
parameter values, (2) the psychophysical (i.e., MDS)
parameter values obtained from a pairs or triads task,
and (3) the features derived via PCA from the C2 acti-
vations of the HMAX model. Furthermore, each model
could either be ﬁtted separately to each individual sub-
jects data, or be ﬁtted once to data pooled across sub-
jects. However, since pooled ﬁts may not accurately
reﬂect the categorization processes of individual ob-
servers (Maddox, 1999), we used only models ﬁtted to
individual subjects data.
Each models free parameters were ﬁtted to maximize
its ability to predict the categorization probabilities
obtained from human observers. The goodness of this ﬁt
was quantiﬁed with the likelihood, L, of the model
having generated the observed probabilities, given that
the ﬁtted model correctly describes the subjects cate-
gorization process (Collett, 1991). This likelihood is the
conditional probability of the set of observed probabil-
ities pi, given the values of the model parameters (which
govern the predicted probabilities bpi ), over the N stim-
ulus objects:
L ¼
YN
i¼1
ni
pini
 
ðbpiÞpinið1 bpiÞð1piÞni ;
where ni is the number of categorization trials per-
formed for object i, and pini is the number of trials inwhich the observer assigned object i to category one.
The likelihood takes the form of a binomial distribution
because subjects responses are treated as independent
binary random variables. A numerical implementation
of adaptive simulated annealing (Ingber, 1989) followed
by a simplex method (Nelder & Mead, 1965) was used to
maximize the likelihood L, or equivalently, minimize the
minus loglikelihood (ln L), which can be computed
more eﬃciently. The range of the likelihood is 06 L6 1,
so the range of the minus loglikelihood is 1P
ln LP 0.
We used the percentage of variance (%-variance) ex-
plained by the model as a more tangible measure for
comparing ﬁtted models. This measure is simply given
by r2, the square of the correlation coeﬃcient between
the observed and predicted probabilities.
Finally, although the loglikelihood (ln L) or %-vari-
ance are appropriate statistics for comparing ﬁtted
models having similar numbers of free parameters,
comparisons of models diﬀering in their number of free
parameters, Nfp, require a statistic such as the Akaike
information criterion (Zucchini, 2000), AIC ¼ 2 ln Lþ
2Nfp, which contains a penalty term proportional to Nfp.
Pairwise model comparisons were made with the Wil-
coxon signed-rank test of either ln L or the AIC, and
we report the median value of ln L or the AIC to
summarize the model ﬁts from a group of individual
subjects.3. Results
3.1. MDS ﬁts
In order to quantify the goodness-of-ﬁt between
subjects Procrustes-transformed MDS conﬁgurations
and the original stimulus conﬁguration, we used Monte
Carlo simulations comparing the residual squared dis-
tances (RSDs) of our subjects MDS conﬁgurations with
the RSDs of random conﬁgurations (see Fig. 5a). The
mean of the pairs-MDS distribution (0.1444) was
roughly twice as close to the original conﬁguration as
would be expected by chance (0.3268), and all pairs-
MDS conﬁgurations were signiﬁcantly closer (p <
0:005) to the original conﬁguration than were the ran-
dom conﬁgurations. Likewise, the triads-MDS conﬁgu-
rations were also all signiﬁcantly closer to the original
space than would be expected by chance (p < 0:005),
although the mean of the triads-MDS distribution
(0.1982) was not as close to the original conﬁguration as
was the pairs-MDS distribution. A paired t-test showed
that the residual squared distances of the pairs-MDS
conﬁgurations were signiﬁcantly smaller than those of
the triads-MDS conﬁgurations (p < 0:05).
To further assess the relationship between these two
methods for obtaining similarity judgments, we per-
mean
(triads)
mean
(pairs)
Fig. 5. A summary of the MDS conﬁgurations obtained with pairs and triads similarity tasks. (a) As measured with the residual squared distance
(RSD), all of the pairs-MDS and triads-MDS conﬁgurations were signiﬁcantly more similar (p < 0:005) to the original conﬁguration of stimulus
parameter values than would be expected by chance. The distribution of RSDs for 105 random conﬁgurations (gray bars, arrows with p-values) was
compared with the RSDs for 10 subjects pairs-MDS (upper, solid lines) and triads-MDS (lower, dashed lines) conﬁgurations. Two identical con-
ﬁgurations would give an RSD of 0, while two unrelated conﬁgurations would give an RSD near the median of the random distribution (0.33). The
RSDs for pairs-MDS were signiﬁcantly smaller than those for triads-MDS (p < 0:05). (b) To directly compare the similarity judgments obtained in
the pairs and triads tasks, we computed two metrics for triads of objects ðx1; x2; x3Þ: (1) the diﬀerence D ¼ Sðx2;x3Þ  Sðx1;x2Þ of two similarity
ratings given in the pairs task, and (2) among triads with similar values of D, the fraction F of trials in which the observer chose ðx2;x3Þ as more
similar than ðx1;x2Þ when viewing ðx1; x2; x3Þ in the triads task. The two measures D and F were highly correlated (q ¼ 0:9946) across 10 subjects.
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responses rather than the derived MDS conﬁgurations
(Fig. 5b). In each trial in the triads task, subjects viewed
three objects ðx1; x2; x3Þ and compared the similarities of
the two pairs ðx1; x2Þ and ðx2; x3Þ. Subjects also directly
rated the similarities of these pairs in the pairs task.
Thus, for each triad ðx1; x2; x3Þ which was shown in the
triads task, we computed Dpairs, the diﬀerence between
the similarity ratings given by the subjects in the pairs
task to the pairs ðx1; x2Þ and ðx2; x3Þ. We then split the
triads trials into groups with similar values of Dpairs.
Within each group we computed Ftriads, the fraction of
trials for which the subject chose the right pair as more
similar than the left pair in the triads task. These two
measures Dpairs and Ftriads were highly correlated in data
obtained from single subjects (q > 0:98 for 9 of 10
subjects) and when data were pooled across subjects
(q ¼ 0:9946; Fig. 5b).3 Note that the RXM and SPC were not used in ﬁtting the data
from Experiment 1 because even with one stored exemplar, these
models carry almost as many free parameters as the number of data
points to be ﬁtted (20). This renders any comparisons among such
models virtually meaningless. This issue is avoided in Experiment 2 due
to the greater number of test exemplars (80).3.2. Model ﬁts
We found no systematic diﬀerences in the ﬁts ob-
tained from diﬀerent model subtypes (such as those
using exponential vs. linear decay of similarity with
distance). Therefore, in further discussion, models are
referred to by their general names (e.g., all-exemplar
models) rather than by the speciﬁc subtypes (e.g., ADM
or GCM).3.2.1. Model ﬁts: Experiment 1
Table 1 summarizes the ﬁts of the all-exemplar, linear
boundary, prototype, and cue-validity models, for each
of the ﬁve sets of objects used in Experiment 1, along
with signiﬁcance values for pairwise comparisons of the
models using the Wilcoxon matched pair signed-rank
test. 3 There were two general patterns of model ﬁts.
The ﬁrst pattern was associated with the ﬁrst two
Brunswik face sets ({EH, ES, NL, MH} and {NL, MH,
EH, ES}, which depend primarily on attention to the
eyes and nose) and the cartoon faces ({EH, ES, NL,
ML}). In this pattern, the all-exemplar models obtained
the best ﬁt, but the boundary model also ﬁt well, in-
distinguishable from the exemplar models. The proto-
type models ﬁt signiﬁcantly worse (p < 0:05) than the
all-exemplar models, but the magnitude of this diﬀer-
ence was small. Finally, the cue-validity models ﬁt sig-
niﬁcantly worse than the other models.
The second pattern was seen with the third Brunswik
face set ({MH, EH, NL, ES}) and the ﬁsh outlines ({TF,
VF, DF, MA}). As in the ﬁrst pattern, the all-exemplar
models obtained the best ﬁt. However, the rest of the
Table 1
Goodness-of-ﬁt of the models tested in Experiment 1
GCM PBI WPSM WCVM
Brunswik faces {EH, ES, NL, MH} %-variance 98.22 98.08 96.39 88.37
lnL 21.15 22.23 27.32 42.50
Brunswik faces {NL, MH, EH, ES} %-variance 95.68 97.75 95.32 74.38
lnL 28.08 26.53 32.81 42.58
Brunswik faces {MH, EH, NL, ES} %-variance 94.02 58.56 61.55 86.30
lnL 36.83 80.57 90.31 52.76
Cartoon faces %-variance 95.50 90.70 90.18 86.66
lnL 30.68 29.95 37.07 53.49
Fish outlines %-variance 97.23 80.98 70.30 96.03
lnL 20.73 32.85 74.36 28.74
%-variance: larger value indicated better ﬁt.
ln L, minus loglikelihood: smaller value indicates better ﬁt.
Bold numbers: model(s) which gave the best ﬁt in each row.
Models whose  ln L was signiﬁcantly worse (p < 0:05) than the best-ﬁtting model in each row.
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Whereas the cue-validity models gave the worst ﬁts in
the ﬁrst pattern, their ﬁts were indistinguishable from
the all-exemplar models in the second pattern. In addi-
tion, the boundary model ﬁt very poorly, signiﬁcantly
worse than the exemplar models (p < 0:05). Finally, the
prototype models ﬁt even more poorly, signiﬁcantly
worse than the exemplar and boundary models
(p < 0:05).
Each of the models tested in Experiment 1 was also
ﬁtted using MDS-based conﬁgurations obtained from
the pairs or triads tasks. Measured by %-variance, both
the MDS-pairs and MDS-triads model ﬁts were strongly
correlated with the ﬁts obtained using the original con-
ﬁguration, as well as with each other (q > 0:90 in each
case). The average goodness-of-ﬁt of the MDS-pairs
models lagged behind that of the original models by 2.3
%-variance, and the MDS-triads models lagged by an
additional 5.5 %-variance.
3.2.2. Model ﬁts: Experiment 2
We ﬁtted subjects categorization probabilities from
Experiment 2 with versions of the roaming-exemplar
model and striatal pattern classiﬁer using 1, 2, 3, 5, 7,
and 10 stored exemplars, 4 as well as the all-exemplar,
prototype, and linear boundary models, and assessed
these ﬁts with three measures (see Table 2): the log-
likelihood, the %-variance explained, and the Akaike
information criterion (AIC).
When the model ﬁts were assessed with their minus
loglikelihoods (Table 2, row 2), we observed a pattern
among the previously tested models similar to the ﬁrst
pattern observed in Experiment 1: the all-exemplar and4 For brevity, the models with 5, 7, and 10 stored exemplars were
withheld from Table 2, since our analysis revealed these data to merely
continue the trends seen with 1, 2, and 3 stored exemplars.boundary models both obtained better (lower) scores
than the prototype model. However, each of these pre-
vious models was outperformed by all versions of the
roaming-exemplar model and striatal pattern classiﬁer.
In addition, for both the RXMhni and the SPChni the
goodness-of-ﬁt increased with the number n of stored
exemplars––an unsurprising result, given that each
stored exemplar reﬂects additional free parameters. The
%-variance values (Table 2, row 1) show a similar pat-
tern, but give a more concrete assessment of how well
the models match the human subjects categorization
behavior: the best-ﬁtting model (the SPCh3i) captured
nearly 92% of the variance, while the worst-ﬁtting model
(the WPSM) captured roughly 85% of the variance.
In contrast, when the model ﬁts were assessed with the
AIC to account for their numbers of free parameters
(Table 2, row 3), the RXM and SPC with one stored
exemplar per category (RXMh1i and SPCh1i) obtained
the best (lowest) scores among all models. These com-
parisons were statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p < 0:05) except against the PBI (p ¼ 0:44).
Moreover, increasing the number of stored exemplars in
either the RXMhni or SPChni was detrimental to the
AIC goodness-of-ﬁt; the SPCh10i (AIC¼ 253.29) and
RXMh10i (SPC¼ 271.85) ﬁt much worse than any of
the other models.
Each of the models was also ﬁtted using representa-
tions of the visual objects based on features derived
from the C2 activations of the HMAX model, rather
than the original physical parameters of the stimuli. We
found that the features derived from HMAX recovered
much of the information about the original physical
parameters. For example, pairwise distances between
objects in the original parameter space were strongly
correlated (q > 0:8) with pairwise distances in the C2-
derived feature space. In addition, we found individual
C2 units whose activities were highly correlated with one
Table 2
Goodness-of-ﬁt of the models tested in Experiment 2; see also Table 3 for further discussion of the models qualitative properties
RXMh1i RXMh2i RXMh3i SPCh1i SPCh2i SPCh3i GCM PBI WPSM
%-variance [orig] 89.36 90.98 91.49 89.36 90.83 91.64 86.84 87.10 84.90
ln L [orig] 75.72 72.06 71.32 75.72 71.65 69.92 83.41 83.66 88.79
AIC [orig] 173.44 178.13 188.64 173.44 177.30 185.84 178.81 177.32 189.57
%-variance [HMAX] 80.96 83.98 85.00 80.96 84.54 85.99 75.62 78.57 72.57
ln L [HMAX] 91.24 84.38 81.89 91.24 82.77 78.11 111.92 97.70 118.19
AIC [HMAX] 204.48 202.76 209.78 204.48 199.55 202.23 235.85 205.40 248.37
%-variance: larger value indicated better ﬁt.
 ln L, minus loglikelihood: smaller value indicates better ﬁt.
AIC, Akaike information criterion: smaller value indicates better ﬁt.
orig: models were ﬁtted using objects represented by the original stimulus parameters, as in Experiment 1.
HMAX: models were ﬁtted using objects represented by features derived from a feed-forward early-vision network.
Bold numbers: model(s) which gave the best ﬁt in each row.
Models whose ﬁts were signiﬁcantly worse (p < 0:05) than the best-ﬁtting model in each row.
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ES: q ¼ 0:91, NL: q ¼ 0:95, MH: q ¼ 0:998).
Among the HMAX-based models, the SPC and RXM
again gave better ﬁts than the other models (see Table 2,
rows 4–6). As before, the uncorrected measures (minus
loglikelihood and %-variance) improved as the number
of stored exemplars increased, with the best overall ﬁt
given by the SPCh3i. In contrast to the ﬁts based on the
physical parameters, the best AIC values were obtained
with two (rather than one) stored exemplars per cate-
gory for both the SPC and RXM, although as before ﬁts
decreased again with more than two stored exemplars.
Overall, the HMAX-based model ﬁts were signiﬁcantly
poorer than the corresponding ﬁts based on the physi-
cal parameters. Nevertheless, the absolute diﬀerence
between the best-ﬁtting HMAX-based and physical
parameter-based models was only 5.6 %-variance.5 Alternatively, a same/diﬀerent task can be used to generate a
confusion matrix for MDS (Sugihara, Edelman, & Tanaka, 1998).4. Discussion
Several authors (Edelman, 1999; Shepard, 1987) have
proposed that neural mechanisms of representation are
based on similarity. Similarity measures can be trans-
formed to feature space representations with multidi-
mensional scaling, a technique that has often been used
as the basis for models of categorization and recognition
(e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). Yet, only recently has the neu-
robiological validity of MDS begun to be investigated
directly with monkey electrophysiology (Op de Beeck
et al., 2001; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002) and human
fMRI (Edelman et al., 1998). Given the practical sig-
niﬁcance of comparing results obtained in monkey and
human studies, it is important to establish the compat-
ibility of the behavioral methods used for the two spe-
cies. Because it is impossible for monkey observers (as
well as for human infants; e.g., Arabie et al., 1975;
Sloutsky & Lo, 1999) to give an analog similarity rating,
a task based on binary choice such as the ‘‘triads’’ taskmust be used instead. 5 Unfortunately, since each triads
trial conveys only relative information about pairwise
similarities, the entire task requires many trials and is
quite time demanding. Thus, adult human subjects
prefer the ‘‘pairs’’ task, which is based on analog simi-
larity judgments, and is less time demanding since each
trial directly conveys absolute information about pair-
wise similarities. Therefore, we compared the results of
the pairs and triads tasks within a set of human subjects
to assess their equivalence in characterizing psycho-
physical representations of similarity. As Fig. 5b shows,
the judgments obtained in theses two tasks were highly
correlated, suggesting that a shared process could ac-
count for subjects performance in both tasks. These
results legitimize comparisons between data from the
pairs task in human subjects and data from the triads
task in monkey subjects.
One purpose of the MDS analysis is to construct an
input representation for the categorization models that
can be tested independently of the original stimulus
conﬁguration. We found that model ﬁts did not improve
when the models were based on pairs-MDS or triads-
MDS conﬁgurations, relative to the original stimulus
conﬁguration. This result agrees with the ﬁndings of
Sigala et al. (2002) using both monkey and human
subjects in experiments similar to those reported here.
Thus, although some models (such as the GCM;
Nosofsky, 1986, 1991) have originally been used exclu-
sively with MDS conﬁgurations, we found that they
achieve similar performance when the original conﬁgu-
ration is used instead. We interpret these results to mean
that subjects can eﬃciently learn a psychological repre-
sentation that is highly similar to the native represen-
tation of a set of objects. The mechanism for this
learning process remains a subject for future investiga-
tion. Nevertheless, the empirical correlation between the
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vance because the MDS procedure is time-intensive both
in the collection of similarity task data and in the
computational analysis of those data. Our results sug-
gest that this analysis step can be bypassed without af-
fecting the comparison of various classiﬁcation models.
Experiment 1 revealed a pattern of model ﬁts similar
to that reported previously (e.g. Maddox & Ashby,
1993; Nosofsky, 1991; Reed, 1972; Sigala et al., 2002).
We found that across several categorization tasks in-
volving diﬀerent types of objects, an all-exemplar model
provided better ﬁts than a linear boundary model, pro-
totype model, or cue-validity model (Table 1). In some
cases the ﬁts of the linear boundary and prototype
models approached those of the all-exemplar model.
The relative strengths of all-exemplar models and
boundary models have been discussed at length
(Maddox & Ashby, 1998; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996;
Nosofsky, 1998). Since each model diﬀers from the
others in more than one way, it is diﬃcult to conclude
which of these diﬀerences contribute to a models success
under particular test conditions. To address this point,
we introduced a ‘‘roaming-exemplar’’ model (RXM)
that can treat independently some of the factors that
were mutually dependent in previous models. It shares a
ﬂexible memory storage architecture with the striatal
pattern classiﬁer (Ashby & Waldron, 1999; Ashby,
Waldron, Lee, & Berkman, 2001). It shares a decision
mechanism with all-exemplar models and prototype
models, since new exemplars are classiﬁed by comparing
the sums of their similarities to the stored exemplars
associated with each of two categories. However, in the
roaming-exemplar model as well as the striatal pattern
classiﬁer, these stored exemplars are not strictly deter-
mined by the training exemplars, but are allowed to
‘‘roam’’ during training within the feature space of the
objects to be classiﬁed.
In Experiment 2, we analyzed individual subjects
categorizations of 12 diﬀerent sets of Brunswik faces by
ﬁtting them with the roaming-exemplar model and
striatal pattern classiﬁer, in addition to the models used
in Experiment 1 (Table 2). While the relationships
among the all-exemplar, prototype, and linear boundaryTable 3
Qualitative comparison of the key models that were tested in Experiment 2
Model type Stored exemplars Main decision bound
Shape
Linear boundary None Linear
Prototype 1, ﬁxed Linear
Roaming-exemplarh1i 1, ‘‘roaming’’ Linear
Striatal-patternh1i 1, ‘‘roaming’’ Piecewise-linear
All-exemplar N , ﬁxed Curved
Roaming-exemplarhNi N , ‘‘roaming’’ Curved
N : number of training exemplars per category.
AIC, Akaike information criterion: smaller value indicates better ﬁt.models have been analyzed previously (Ashby &
Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Ashby &Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky,
1990), the improved model ﬁts obtained with the RXM
and SPC in Experiment 2 aﬀord new insights into the
strengths and weaknesses of previous models (see Table
3 for an overview).
All-exemplar vs. prototype models. There are two sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between these models. First, in pro-
totype models, the stored exemplars are by construction
deﬁned as the arithmetic mean in feature space of the
training exemplars, while in all-exemplar models the
stored exemplars occupy other locations. Second, all-
exemplar models allow more than one stored exemplar
per category, while prototype models allow only one,
regardless of the number of training exemplars.
This second diﬀerence is linked with the question of
category abstraction: storage of a category prototype
implies a more abstract representation than simple
memorization of all training exemplars. This places a
higher burden on the learning process, since the system
must select the correct abstraction, but makes post-
learning categorization more simple, since new exemp-
lars have only to be compared with the category
prototypes. All-exemplar models make the opposite
trade-oﬀ: since no abstraction is involved, learning is
straightforward as each training exemplar is simply
packed away into memory, but post-learning categori-
zation is complicated since a new exemplar must be
compared with every stored exemplar in memory. While
this requirement is not neurobiologically unreasonable
in typical psychophysical experiments which use few
training exemplars per category, it seems less likely to be
applicable to natural visual categories, which may con-
tain thousands or more of exemplars. Furthermore, bio-
logical systems are likely to spend more time in using
categories than in learning them, at least for highly sa-
lient categories (e.g., male/female faces, poisonous/non-
poisonous fruit). Such arguments lend some a priori
credence to the notion of a prototype model, but are
entirely hidden from statistical comparisons, since nei-
ther the contents of the memory nor the complexity of
the learning process are free parameters of the models.
Indeed, past comparisons between all-exemplar andary Iso-probability con-
tours
Goodness-of-ﬁt
Orientation Rank (AIC)
Arbitrary Linear 2 (177.3)
Constrained Curved 4 (189.6)
Arbitrary Curved 1 (173.4)
Arbitrary Piecewise-linear 1 (173.4)
Constrained Curved 3 (178.7)
Arbitrary Curved 5 (279.8)
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evidence favoring the all-exemplar models.
When the contents of the memory locations become
explicit free parameters, questions concerning the im-
portance of memory capacity can be addressed statisti-
cally. For example, by comparing either the RXMh1i or
the equivalent SPCh1i with a prototype model, we ex-
amine only the ﬁrst diﬀerence mentioned above between
all-exemplar models and prototype models (whether
memory traces are ﬁxed at the category mean). On the
other hand, by comparing the RXMh1i with the
RXMhni (n > 1) we examine only the second diﬀerence
(changing the number of stored exemplars). Our results
from Experiment 2 (Table 2) demonstrate a large im-
provement from allowing roaming, rather than ﬁxed,
stored exemplars (AIC: RXMh1i, SPCh1i ¼ 173:4,
prototype¼ 189.6), while allowing additional stored
exemplars actually leads to a decline in goodness-of-ﬁt
when the additional memory is counted among the
models free parameters (AIC: RXMh10i ¼ 271:9,
RXMh1i ¼ 173:4). Thus, although the empirical success
of all-exemplar models appears to support a rejection of
category abstraction, our results show that in fact we
should only reject the strict notion of abstraction in-
volving category prototypes.
Prototype vs. linear boundary models. These two
models are similar in that each has a decision boundary
(i.e., the iso-probability density surface where the cate-
gorization probability density equals 0.5) that is a hy-
perplane in stimulus parameter space (Ashby &
Maddox, 1993). The models also have two important
diﬀerences. First, for prototype models, the decision
boundary must be orthogonal to the vector connecting
the two category prototypes in stimulus parameter
space, while for linear boundary models, the decision
boundary can have an arbitrary orientation. Second,
consider the iso-probability density surfaces with
p 6¼ 0:5: for the linear boundary model, these are hy-
perplanes parallel to the decision boundary, but for the
prototype model, these are paraboloid surfaces with a
curvature that increases as p diverges from 0.5. Con-
ceptually, this means that for the linear boundary
model, decision thresholds are the same at every point
along the category boundary in feature space, while for
the prototype model, decision thresholds are narrowest
(i.e., the model is most conﬁdent) at the center of feature
space, near the category prototypes. Intuitively, the
behavior of the prototype model seems more natural––
new objects are categorized more accurately when they
are similar to previously seen objects––but our results
from Experiment 1 along with others results (e.g., No-
sofsky, 1991) clearly contradict this intuition.
Again, a more ﬂexible model can help to provide some
insight into this issue. In particular, the RXMh1i and
SPCh1i are like the prototype model with curved, rather
than planar, iso-probability surfaces, but are like thelinear boundary model in that the main decision
boundary can have an arbitrary orientation. Our results
from Experiment 2 demonstrate that with these two
qualities combined, the RXMh1i and SPCh1i ﬁt human
behavior signiﬁcantly better than either the prototype or
linear boundary models (AIC: RXMh1i, SPCh1i ¼
173:4, prototype ¼ 189:6, linear boundary ¼ 177:3).
All-exemplar vs. linear boundary models. By extension
of the previous two comparisons, the diﬀerences be-
tween the all-exemplar model and the linear boundary
model are even more numerous. The all-exemplar model
allows for curved decision surfaces, but the orientation
of the surface has limited ﬂexibility. In contrast, the
linear boundary model allows only ﬂat decision surfaces,
but these may have arbitrary orientation. Again, the
RXM can combine the separate strengths of these two
models.
In the RXM, the parameters which describe the stored
exemplars become free parameters of the model, and can
be incorporated into comparisons among models using
statistical measures such as the Akaike information
criterion. This allows us to address the importance of
memory by comparing diﬀerent versions of the RXM
with diﬀerent numbers of stored exemplars. With this
framework, we can now provide a better answer as to
why models which are otherwise appealing in their con-
ceptual simplicity, such as prototype models, are
consistently outperformed by all-exemplar models: all-
exemplar models allow better ﬂexibility in matching the
shape and orientation of decision surfaces to those used
by human observers. Our results show that the good-
ness-of-ﬁt of all-exemplar models can be improved upon
by allowing ‘‘roaming’’ stored exemplars, and thus an
unconstrained decision boundary, without committing
to high memory demands or to a lack of category-level
abstraction.
RXM vs. SPC. Computationally, the RXM and SPC
are quite similar to each other, as well as to several
earlier models (Anderson, 1991; Kruschke, 1992; see
also Ashby & Waldron, 1999), in that they each rely on
a set of units representing locations in feature space, and
categorize new inputs based on the distance in feature
space between the input and the various stored units.
The main qualitative diﬀerence is at the decision stage,
where the RXM produces smoothly curved decision
boundaries, while the SPC produces piecewise-linear
decision boundaries. This is because in the RXM, the
categorization decision is based on contributions from
all of the stored units, with weights proportional to the
distance of the stored units from the input, while in the
SPC, only the nearest stored unit of each category is
considered. In this sense, the SPC involves a much
stronger non-linearity than the RXM. This sharp non-
linearity may not be strictly implemented in neural cir-
cuitry; rather, a biological implementation might have
to rely on a ‘‘softmax’’ approximation (Riesenhuber &
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gradual decay of similarity with distance as in the RXM.
This question remains to be resolved by further neuro-
physiological study.
Despite the computational similarities of the SPC and
RXM, each is derived from previous models whose
neurobiological implications may appear to put the two
models at odds. We have proposed the RXM as a gen-
eralization of prototype models and all-exemplar models
(i.e., GCM). All-exemplar models, which propose one
hidden unit for every training exemplar, have in par-
ticular carried the implication that observers may rely
on explicit memory of individual visual stimuli, and that
the models hidden units correspond to these memory
traces (e.g., Knowlton, 1999). This stands in contrast to
neuropsychological evidence from patients with amnesia
who, despite an impairment in recognition tasks re-
quiring declarative memory of individual exemplars, are
relatively unimpaired in various tasks requiring category
learning (Filoteo, Maddox, & Davis, 2001; Knowlton &
Squire, 1993; Squire & Knowlton, 1995). For this rea-
son, Ashby and Waldron (1999) proposed that the
striatal units in the SPC are primarily response-associ-
ated; that is, the units are primarily involved in decision,
rather than perception. We do not make any claims
regarding whether the hidden units in the RXM are
essentially explicit memory traces, particularly since the
hidden units are allowed to occupy points in feature
space that were never directly related to a training ex-
emplar. However, electrophysiogical evidence does
suggest that the mechanisms that are shaped during
category learning also aﬀect perception. Sigala and Lo-
gothetis (2002) showed that, after category learning,
inferotemporal neurons in the macaque were more
sensitive to features that were diagnostic of category
membership than to non-diagnostic features (although
Ashby & Ell, 2001 reviewed studies in which exposure to
visual stimuli that were associated with non-visual cate-
gories such as good/bad tastes did not lead to a change
in visual cell response properties). Furthermore, be-
havioral data (MDS) showed that monkeys perception
also shifts as a result of category training (Sigala et al.,
2002), supporting the idea that the hidden units tuned to
speciﬁc features in a categorization model may not op-
erate solely at the decision stage, but may also be di-
rectly involved in perception. This is not incompatible
with the evidence from amnesic patients; it may be that
categorization relies on neural representations that are
explicit in the sense of being discrete and minimally
distributed, but do not constitute ‘‘explicit memory’’ in
the sense of being behaviorally accessible for declarative
memory. In any case, current psychophysical evidence
alone cannot discriminate whether a models mathe-
matical constructs correspond to neuronal processes
occurring in speciﬁc cortical areas such as the striatum,
inferotemporal cortex, or even prefrontal cortex.HMAX. We have begun to ground these high-level
models of categorization more ﬁrmly in neurobiology by
combining them with a model (HMAX; Riesenhuber &
Poggio, 1999) that encapsulates the processes that
functionally precede object categorization in the visual
system. Unlike the original categorization models which
receive a high-level feature-based description of their
input, these hybrid models operate directly on a pixel-
based image space representation of the input. Although
the hybrid models ﬁt relatively poorly when compared
with the original models, their absolute performance is
encouraging. The best-ﬁtting HMAX-SPCh3imodel was
able to account for nearly 86% of the variance seen in
subjects responses. If anything, our results underesti-
mate the capabilities of a hybrid model, since we used
only the ﬁrst 4 of 576 principal component vectors of the
raw HMAX output, sacriﬁcing 20% of the available
variance. This performance was achieved using straight-
forward bottom–up processing of the input images, with
no task-speciﬁc training or context-speciﬁc top–down
modulation of the early-vision stage. Yet, such top–
down eﬀects are certainly involved in the performance of
human subjects, and the original high-level features are
indeed a close approximation of subjects internal rep-
resentations as shown by MDS experiments. It thus
appears that current high-level models of categorization
can be linked to more detailed biological models of vi-
sion. A better integration of early-vision and object-
categorization models––for example, by allowing at-
tentional weights to propagate from the decision stage
back to earlier sensory levels––is likely to uncover a
more complete picture of the categorization process.
Generalization and learning. In the most general terms,
categorization is a process with four components: (1)
external input (visual stimuli), (2) internal input (pre-
existing memories and neural state), and (3) a mecha-
nism that combines the inputs to produce (4) an
observable output (categorization behavior). A com-
plete theory of categorization should quantitatively de-
scribe an internal mechanism that can be appropriately
tuned by a learning process involving exposure to a
limited set of training exemplars (e.g., Ashby & Ell,
2001; Nosofsky et al., 1992), and should describe how
diﬀerences in observers pre-existing internal states lead
to diﬀerent categorization behavior given the same in-
put. In the context of the RXM or SPC, for example,
such a theory might help address questions such as how
the number of hidden units is adjusted during learning,
perhaps in relation to the diﬃculty in separating cate-
gories from one another.
By this standard, the models we have discussed pro-
vide only a partial theory, in that they only describe the
fully trained mechanism without oﬀering a process for
learning the tunable parameters of that mechanism. We
have inferred the ﬁnal values of these parameters by
ﬁtting the models to human behavior on a set of test
R.J. Peters et al. / Vision Research 43 (2003) 2265–2280 2279exemplars. 6 In other words, by collecting and modeling
observers responses to the test exemplars, we have only
addressed the question of what did observers learn, ra-
ther than the more complex question of how did they
learn it. Nevertheless, our descriptive results provide
valuable constraints for more complete future models of
the learning process; after all, a model cannot success-
fully describe the learning process without also suc-
cessfully describing the outcome of that process.
An open question is to what extent these computa-
tional insights, based on psychophysical experiments
using simple, four-feature stimuli, carry over to the
identiﬁcation and categorization of complex objects in
natural scenes. One challenge is to translate this analysis
of the computational principles underlying object cate-
gorization into a mature understanding of how neurons
along the ventral visual pathway can implement such
operations (Op de Beeck et al., 2001; Sigala & Logo-
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